Demonax | Hellenic Library Beta

This page is read only. You can view the source, but not change it. Ask your administrator if you think this is wrong.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 20, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1981.

====== Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics Book 7 ======

 
[1234b] [18]

Friendship—its nature and qualities, what constitutes a friend, and whether the term friendship has one or several meanings, [20] and if several, how many, and also what is our duty towards a friend and what are the just claims of friendship—is a matter that calls for investigation no less than any of the things that are fine and desirable in men's characters. For to promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political science; and people say that it is on this account that goodness is a valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by one another cannot be each other's friends. Furthermore we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly displayed towards friends; it is thought that a good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a state of the moral character; and if one wishes to make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them friends, for true friends do not wrong one another. But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are either the same or nearly the same thing.

In addition to this, we consider a friend to be one of the greatest goods, and friendlessness and solitude a very terrible thing, because the whole of life and voluntary association is with friends; [1235a] [1] for we pass our days with our family or relations or comrades, children, parents or wife. And our private rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and do not depend on us.

Many questions are raised about friendship—first, on the line of those who take in wider considerations and extend the term. For some hold that like is friend to like, whence the sayings:

    “ Mark how God ever brings like men together
    ”
    Hom. Od. 17.218

1;

    “ For jackdaw by the side of jackdaw . . .
    ”

2; “And thief knows thief and wolf his fellow wolf.”3

And the natural philosophers even arrange the whole of nature in a system by assuming as a first principle that like goes to like, owing to which Empedocles4 said that the dog sits on the tiling because it is most like him.5

Some people then give this account of a friend; but others say that opposite is dear to opposite, since it is what is loved and desired that is dear to everybody, and the dry does not desire the dry but the wet (whence the sayings—"Earth loveth rain,"6 and "In all things change is sweet—"7 change being transition to the opposite), whereas like hates like, for "Potter against potter has a grudge,"8 and animals that live on the same food are hostile to one another. [20] These opinions, therefore, are thus widely variant. One party thinks that the like is friend and the opposite foe—

    “ The less is rooted enemy to the more
    For ever, and begins the day of hate,
    ”
    Eur. Phoen. 539f.

9

and moreover adversaries are separated in locality, whereas friendship seems to bring men together. The other party say that opposites are friends, and Heracleitus10 rebukes the poet who wrote—

    “ Would strife might perish out of heaven and earth,
    ”
    Hom. Il. 18.107

for, he says, there would be no harmony without high and low notes, and no animals without male and female, which are opposites.

These, then, are two opinions about friendship, and being so widely separated they are too general11; but there are others that are closer together and more akin to the facts of observation. Some persons think that it is not possible for bad men to be friends, but only for the good. Others think it strange that mothers should not love their own children (and maternal affection we see existing even among animals—at least, animals choose to die for their young). Others hold that only what is useful is a friend, the proof being that all men actually do pursue the useful, and discard what is useless even in their own persons (as the old Socrates12 used to say, instancing spittle, hair and nails), and that we throw away even parts of the body that are of no use, and finally the body itself, [1235b] [1] when it dies, as a corpse is useless—but people that have a use for it keep it, as in Egypt. Now all these factors13 seem to be somewhat opposed to one another. For like is of no use to like and opposition is farthest removed from likeness, and at the same time opposite is most useless to opposite, since opposite is destructive of opposite. Moreover some think that to gain a friend is easy, but others that it is the rarest thing to recognize a friend, and not possible without misfortune, as everybody wants to be thought a friend of the prosperous; and others maintain that we must not trust even those who stay with us in our misfortunes, because they are deceiving us and pretending, in order that by associating with us when unfortunate they may gain our friendship when we are again prosperous.

Accordingly a line of argument must be taken that will best explain to us the views held on these matters and at the same time solve the difficulties and contradictions. And this will be secured if the contradictory views are shown to be held with some reason. For such a line of argument will be most in agreement with the observed facts: and in the upshot, if what is said is true in one sense but not true in another, both the contradictory views stand good.

There is also a question as to whether what is dear to us is the pleasant or the good. [20] If we hold dear what we desire (and that is specially characteristic of love, for "None is a lover that holds not dear for aye"14), and desire is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is the pleasant that is dear; whereas if we hold dear what we wish, it is the good; but the pleasant and the good are different things.

We must therefore attempt to decide about these matters and others akin to them, taking as a starting point the following. The thing desired and wished is either the good or the apparent good. Therefore also the pleasant is desired, for it is an apparent good, since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (as appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the spirit).15 Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear.

This being decided, we must make another assumption. Things good are some of them absolutely good, others good for someone but not good absolutely; and the same things are absolutely good and absolutely pleasant. For things advantageous for a healthy body we pronounce good for the body absolutely, but things good for a sick body not—for example doses of medicine and surgical operations; and likewise also the things pleasant for a healthy and perfect body are pleasant for the body absolutely, for example to live in the light and not in the dark, although the reverse is the case for a man with ophthalmia. And the pleasanter wine is not the wine pleasant to a man whose palate has been corrupted by tippling, since sometimes they pour in a dash of vinegar, but to the uncorrupted taste. [1236a] [1] And similarly also in the case of the spirit, the really pleasant things are not those pleasant to children and animals, but those pleasant to the adult; at least it is these that we prefer when we remember both. And as a child or animal stands to an adult human being, so the bad and foolish man stands to the good and wise man; and these take pleasure in things that correspond to their characters, and these are things good and fine.

Since therefore good is a term of more than one meaning (for we call one thing good because that is its essential nature, but another because it is serviceable and useful), and furthermore pleasant includes both what is absolutely pleasant and absolutely good and what is pleasant for somebody and apparently good—, as in the case of inanimate objects we may choose a thing and love it for each of these reasons, so also in the case of a human being, one man we love because of his character, and for goodness, another because he is serviceable and useful, another because he is pleasant, and for pleasure. And a man becomes a friend when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the other are in some way aware of this.

It follows, therefore, that there are three sorts of friendship, and that they are not all so termed in respect of one thing or as species of one genus, nor yet have they the same name entirely by accident. For all these uses of the term are related to one particular sort of friendship which is primary, like the term 'surgical'—and we speak of a surgical mind and a surgical hand and a surgical instrument and a surgical operation, [20] but we apply the term properly to that which is primarily so called. The primary is that of which the definition is implicit in the definition of all, for example a surgical instrument is an instrument that a surgeon would use, whereas the definition of the instrument is not implicit in that of surgeon. Therefore in every case people seek the primary, and because the universal is primary they assume that also the primary is universal; but this is untrue. Hence in the case of friendship, they cannot take account of all the observed facts. For as one definition does not fit, they think that the other kinds of friendship are not friendships at all; but really they are, although not in the same way, but when they find that the primary friendship does not fit, assuming that it would be universal if it really were primary, they say that the others are not friendships at all. But in reality there are many kinds of friendships: this was among the things said already,16 as we have distinguished three senses of the term friendship—one sort has been defined as based on goodness, another on utility, another on pleasure.

Of these the one based on utility is assuredly the friendship of most people; for they love one another because they are useful, and in so far as they are and so, as says the proverb—“Glaucus, an ally is a friend, as long as he our battle fights,17 and

    “ Athens no longer knows Megara.
    ”
    Fr. Eleg. Adespota 6 (Bergk)

On the other hand friendship based on pleasure is the friendship of the young, for they have a sense of what is pleasant; hence young people's friendship easily changes, for since their characters change as they grow up, their taste in pleasure also changes. But the friendship in conformity with goodness is the friendship of the best men. [1236b] [1]

It is clear from this that the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual reciprocity of affection and purpose. For the object of affection is dear to the giver of it, but also the giver of affection is himself dear to the object. This friendship, therefore, only occurs in man, for he alone perceives purpose; but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small extent between the domestic animals and man, and between animals themselves, for instance Herodotus's account of the friendship between the crocodile and the sandpiper,18 and the perching together and separating of birds of which soothsayers speak. The bad may be each other's friends from motives both of utility and of pleasure; though some say that they are not really friends, because the primary kind of friendship does not belong to them, since obviously a bad man will injure a bad man, and those who suffer injury from one another do not feel affection for one another. But as a matter of fact bad men do feel affection for one another, though not according to the primary form of friendship—because clearly nothing hinders their being friends under the other forms, since for the sake of pleasure they put up with one another although they are being harmed, so long as they are lacking in self-restraint. The view is also held, when people look into the matter closely, that those who feel affection for each other on account of pleasure are not friends, because it is not the primary friendship, since that is reliable but this is unreliable. [20] But as a matter of fact it is friendship, as has been said, though not that sort of friendship but one derived from it. Therefore to confine the use of the term friend to that form of friendship alone is to do violence to observed facts, and compels one to talk paradoxes; though it is not possible to bring all friendship under one definition. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is, that in a sense the primary sort of friendship alone is friendship, but in a sense all sorts are, not as having a common name by accident and standing in a merely chance relationship to one another, nor yet as falling under one species, but rather as related to one thing.

And since the same thing is absolutely good and absolutely pleasant at the same time if nothing interferes, and the true friend and friend absolutely is the primary friend, and such is a friend chosen in and for himself (and he must necessarily be such, for he for whom one wishes good for his own sake must necessarily be desirable for his own sake), a true friend is also absolutely pleasant; owing to which it is thought that a friend of any sort is pleasant. But we must define this still further, for it is debatable whether what is good merely for oneself is dear or what is absolutely good, and whether the actual exercise of affection is accompanied by pleasure, so that an object of affection is also pleasant, or not. Both questions must be brought to the same issue; for things not absolutely good but possibly evil are to be avoided, and also a thing not good for oneself is no concern of oneself, but what is sought for is that things absolutely good shall be good for oneself. For the absolutely good is absolutely desirable, but what is good for oneself is desirable for oneself; [1237a] [1] and the two ought to come into agreement. This is effected by goodness; and the purpose of political science is to bring it about in cases where it does not yet exist. And one who is a human being is well adapted to this and on the way to it (for by nature things that are absolutely good are good to him), and similarly a man rather than a woman and a gifted man rather than a dull one; but the road is through pleasure—it is necessary that fine things shall be pleasant. When there is discord between them, a man is not yet perfectly good; for it is possible for unrestraint to be engendered in him, as unrestraint is caused by discord between the good and the pleasant in the emotions.

Therefore since the primary sort of friendship is in accordance with goodness, friends of this sort will be absolutely good in themselves also, and this not because of being useful, but in another manner. For good for a given person and good absolutely are twofold; and the same is the case with states of character as with profitableness—what is profitable absolutely and what is profitable for given persons are different things (just as taking exercise is a different thing from taking drugs). So the state of character called human goodness is of two kinds— for let us assume that man is one of the things that are excellent by nature: consequently the goodness of a thing excellent by nature is good absolutely, but that of a thing not excellent by nature is only good for that thing.

The case of the pleasant also, therefore, is similar. For here we must pause and consider whether there is any friendship without pleasure, [20] and how such a friendship differs from other friendship, and on which exactly of the two things19 the affection depends—do we love a man because he is good even if he is not pleasant, but not because he is pleasant?20 Then, affection having two meanings,21 does actual affection seem to involve pleasure because activity is good? It is clear that as in science recent studies and acquirements are most fully apprehended, because of their pleasantness,22 so with the recognition of familiar things, and the principle is the same in both cases. By nature at all events the absolutely good is absolutely pleasant, and the relatively good is pleasant to those for whom it is good.23 Hence ipso facto like takes pleasure in like, and man is the thing most pleasant to man; so that as this is so even with imperfect things, it is clearly so with things when perfected, and a good man is a perfect man. And if active affection is the reciprocal choice, accompanied by pleasure, of one another's acquaintance, it is clear that friendship of the primary kind is in general the reciprocal choice of things absolutely good and pleasant because they are good and pleasant; and friendship itself is a state from which such choice arises. For its function is an activity, but this not external but within the lover himself; whereas the function of every faculty is external, for it is either in another or in oneself qua other. Hence to love is to feel pleasure but to be loved is not; for being loved is not an activity of the thing loved, whereas loving is an activity—the activity of friendship; and loving occurs only in an animate thing, whereas being loved occurs with an inanimate thing also, for even inanimate things are loved. And since to love actively is to treat the loved object qua loved, [1237b] [1] and the friend is an object of love to the friend qua dear to him but not qua musician or medical man, the pleasure of friendship is the pleasure derived from the person himself qua himself; for the friend loves him as himself, not because he is something else. Consequently if he does not take pleasure in him qua good, it is not the primary friendship. Nor ought any accidental quality to cause more hindrance than the friend's goodness causes delight; for surely, if a person is very evil-smelling, people cut him—he must be content with our goodwill, he must not expect our society!

This then is the primary friendship, which all people recognize. It is on account of it that the other sorts are considered to be friendship, and also that their claim is disputed—for friendship seems to be some thing stable, and only this friendship is stable; for a formed judgement is stable, and not doing things quickly or easily makes the judgement right. And there is no stable friendship without confidence, and confidence only comes with time; for it is necessary to make trial, as Theognis says:

    “ You cannot know the mind of man nor woman
    Before have you tried them as you try cattle.
    ”
    Theog. 125f.

Those who become friends without the test of time are not real friends but only wish to be friends; and such a character very readily passes for friendship, [20] because when eager to be friends they think that by rendering each other all friendly services they do not merely wish to be friends but actually are friends. But as a matter of fact it happens in friendship as in everything else; people are not healthy merely if they wish to be healthy, so that even if people wish to be friends they are not actually friends already. A proof of this is that people who have come into this position without first testing one another are easily set at variance; for though men are not set at variance easily about things in which they have allowed each other to test them, in cases where they have not, whenever those who are attempting to set then, at variance produce evidence they may be convinced. At the same time it is manifest that this friendship does not occur between base people either; for the base and evil-natured man is distrustful towards everybody, because he measures other people by himself. Hence good men are more easily cheated, unless as a result of trial they are distrustful. But the base prefer the goods of nature to a friend, and none of them love people more than things; and so they are not friends, for the proverbial 'common property as between friends' is not realized in this way—the friend is made an appendage of the things, not the things of the friends.

Therefore the first kind of friendship does not occur between many men, because it is difficult to test many—one would have to go and live with each of them. Nor indeed should one exercise choice in the case of a friend in the same way as about a coat; although in all matters it seems the mark of a sensible man to choose the better of two things, and if he had been wearing his worse coat for a long time and had not yet worn his better one, the better one ought to be chosen—but you ought not in place of an old friend to choose one whom you do not know to be a better man. [1238a] [1] For a friend is not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the peck of salt' has come to be proverbial. At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful. But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once.

These things, therefore, show the correctness of the saying that friendship is a thing to be relied on, just as happiness is a thing that is self-sufficing. And it has been rightly said24: "Nature is permanent, but wealth is not—" although it would be much finer to say 'Friendship' than 'Nature.'25 And it is proverbial that time shows a friend, and also misfortunes more than good fortune. For then the truth of the saying 'friends' possessions are common property' is clear for only friends, instead of the natural goods and natural evils on which good and bad fortune turn, choose a human being rather than the presence of the former and the absence of the latter; [20] and misfortune shows those who are not friends really but only because of some casual utility. And both are shown by time; for even the useful friend is not shown quickly, but rather the pleasant one—except that one who is absolutely pleasant is also not quick to show himself. For men are like wines and foods; the sweetness of those is quickly evident, but when lasting longer it is unpleasant and not sweet, and similarly in the case of men. For absolute pleasantness is a thing to be defined by the End it effects and the time it lasts. And even the multitude would agree, not in consequence of results only, but in the same way as in the case of a drink they call it sweeter—for a drink fails to be pleasant not because of its result, but because its pleasantness is not continuous, although at first it quite takes one in.

The primary form of friendship therefore, and the one that causes the name to be given to the others, is friendship based on goodness and due to the pleasure of goodness, as has been said before. The other friendships occur even among children and animals and wicked people: whence the sayings— "Two of an age each other gladden" and "Pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."26

And also the bad may be pleasant to each other not as being bad or neutral,27 but if for instance both are musicians or one fond of music and the other a musician, and in the way in which all men have some good in them and so fit in with one another. Further they might be mutually useful and beneficial (not absolutely but for their purpose) not as being bad or neutral. [1238b] [1] It is also possible for a bad man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to the good man for his purpose at the time-and the good man to the uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it for the given purpose. Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are sociable28 even though good), or in the way in which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of good.

These then are three kinds of friendship; and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of goodness.

But another variety of these kinds is friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a man, [20] for that is a different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject; just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically.29 The friendship of father for son is in this class, and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of these sorts of friendship themselves there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else to love in another way. And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the same. And in the same way also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar manner; and also in the case of pleasure.30 This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their affection. Hence Aenicus31 has said: "A loved one so would speak, but not a lover." But they think that the reason is the same. [1239a] [1] There being then, as has been said,32 three kinds of friendship, based on goodness, utility and pleasantness, these are again divided in two, one set being on a footing of equality and the other on one of superiority. Though both sets, therefore, are friendships, only when they are on an equality are the parties friends; for it would be absurd for a man to be a friend of a child, though he does feel affection for him and receive it from him. In some cases, while the superior partner ought to receive affection, if he gives it he is reproached as loving an unworthy object; for affection is measured by the worth of the friends and by one sort of equality.33 So in some cases there is properly a dissimilarity of affection because of inferiority of age, in others on the ground of goodness or birth or some other such superiority; it is right for the superior to claim to feel34 either less affection or none, alike in a friendship of utility and in one of pleasure and one based on goodness. So in cases of small degrees of superiority disputes naturally occur (for a small amount is not of importance in some matters, as in weighing timber, though in gold plate it is; but people judge smallness of amount badly, since one's own good because of its nearness appears big and that of others because of its remoteness small); but when there is an excessive amount of difference, then even the parties themselves do not demand that they ought to be loved in return, or not loved alike—for example, if one were claiming a return of love from God. [20] It is manifest, therefore, that men are friends when they are on an equality, but that a return of affection is possible without their being friends. And it is clear why men seek friendship on a basis of superiority more than that on one of equality; for in the former case they score both affection and a sense of superiority at the same time. Hence with some men the flatterer is more esteemed than the friend, for he makes the person flattered appear to score both advantages. And this most of all characterizes men ambitious of honors, since to be admired implies superiority. Some persons grow up by nature affectionate and others ambitious; one who enjoys loving more than being loved is affectionate, whereas the other enjoys being loved more. So the man who enjoys being admired and loved is a lover of superiority, whereas the other, the affectionate man, loves the pleasure of loving. For this he necessarily possesses by the mere activity of loving; for being loved is an accident, as one can be loved without knowing it, but one cannot love without knowing it. Loving depends, more than being loved, on the actual feeling, whereas being loved corresponds with the nature of the object. A sign of this is that a friend, if both things were not possible, would choose to know the other person rather than to be known by him, as for example women do when they allow others to adopt their children, and Andromache in the tragedy of Antiphon.35 Indeed the wish to be known seems to be selfish, and its motive a desire to receive and not to confer some benefit, whereas to wish to know a person is for the sake of conferring benefit and bestowing affection. [1239b] [1] For this reason we praise those who remain constant in affection towards the dead; for they know, but are not known. It has, then, been stated that there are several modes of friendship, and how many modes there are, namely three, and that receiving affection and having one's affection returned, and friends on an equality and those on a footing of superiority, are different.

But as the term 'friend' is used in a more universal sense as well, as was also said at the beginning,36 by those who take in wider considerations (some saying that what is like is dear, others what is opposite), we must also speak about these forms of friendship and their relation to the kinds that have been discussed. As for likeness, it connects with pleasantness and also with goodness. For the good is simple, whereas the bad is multiform; and also the good man is always alike and does not change in character, whereas the wicked and the foolish are quite different in the evening from what they were in the morning. Hence if wicked men do not hit it off together, they are not friends with one another but they separate; yet an insecure friendship is not friendship at all. So the like is dear to us in this way, because the good is like. But in a way it is also dear on the score of pleasantness; for to those who are alike the same things are pleasant, and also everything is by nature pleasant to itself. [20] Owing to this relations find one another's voices and characters and society pleasantest, and so with the lower animals; and in this way it is possible even for bad men to feel affection for each other: "But pleasure welds the bad man to the bad."37 But opposite is dear to opposite on the score of utility. For the like is useless to itself, and therefore master needs slave and slave master, man and wife need one another; and the opposite is pleasant and desirable as useful, not as contained in the End but as a means to the End—for when a thing has got what it desires it has arrived at its End, and does not strive to get its opposite, for example the hot the cold and the wet the dry.

But in a way love of the opposite is also love of the good. For opposites strive to reach one another through the middle point, for they strive after each other as tallies,38 because in that way one middle thing results from the two. Hence accidentally love of the good is love of the opposite, but essentially it is love of the middle, for opposites do not strive to reach one another but the middle. If when people have got too cold they are subjected to heat, and when they have got too hot to cold, they reach a mean temperature, and similarly in other matters; but without such treatment they are always in a state of desire, because they are not at the middle points. But a man in the middle enjoys without passionate desire things by nature pleasant, whereas the others enjoy everything that takes them outside their natural state. This kind of relationship, then, exists even between inanimate things; but when it occurs in the case of living things it becomes affection. [1240a] [1] Hence sometimes people take delight in persons unlike themselves, the stiff for instance in the witty and the active in the lazy, for they are brought by one another into the middle state. Hence accidentally, as was said,39 opposites are dear to opposites also on account of the good.

It has, then, been said how many kinds of friendship there are, and what are the different senses in which people are termed friends, and also givers and objects of affection, both in a manner that makes them actually friends and without being friends.

The question whether one is one's own friend or not involves much consideration. Some think that every man is his own best friend, and they use this friendship as a standard by which to judge his friendship for his other friends. On theoretical grounds, and in view of the accepted attributes of friends, self-love and love of others are in some respects opposed but in others manifestly similar. For in a way self-love is friendship by analogy, but not absolutely. For being loved and loving involve two separate factors; owing to which a man is his own friend rather in the way in which, in the case of the unrestrained and the self-restrained man, we have said40 how one has those qualities voluntarily or involuntarily—namely by the parts of one's spirit being related to each other in a certain way; and all such matters are a similar thing,whether a man can be his own friend or foe, and whether a man can treat himself unjustly. [20] For all these relations involve two separate factors; in so far then as the spirit is in a manner two, these relations do in a manner belong to it, but in so far as the two are not separate, they do not.

From the state of friendship for oneself are determined the remaining modes of friendship under which we usually study it in our discourses.41 For a man is thought to be a friend who wishes for somebody things that are good, or that he believes to be good, not on his own account but for the other's sake; and in another way when a man wishes another's existence—even though not bestowing goods on him, let alone existence—for that other's sake and not for his own, he would be thought to be in a high degree the friend of that other; and in another way a man is a friend of one whose society he desires merely for the sake of his company and not for something else, as fathers desire their children's existence, though they associate with other people. All these cases conflict with one another; some men do not think they are loved unless the friend wishes them this or that particular good, others unless their existence is desired, others unless their society. Again we shall reckon it affection to grieve with one who grieves not for some ulterior motive—as for instance slaves in relation to their masters share their grief because when in grief they are harsh, and not for their masters' own sake, as mothers grieve with their children, and birds that share each other's pain. For a friend wishes most of all that he might not only feel pain when his friend is in pain but feel actually the same pain—for example when he is thirsty, share his thirst—if this were possible, and if not, as nearly the same as may be. The same principle applies also in the case of joy; it is characteristic of a friend to rejoice for no other reason than because the other is rejoicing. [1240b] [1] Again there are sayings about friendship such as 'Amity is equality' and 'True friends have one spirit.' All these sayings refer back to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration, because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate. And wishing for the other to exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being one spirit'42 and being unable even to live without one another but dying together—for this is the case with the single individual, and he associates with himself in this way,—all these characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself. In a wicked man on the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is desirable to himself. This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice. Hence a man's affection for himself carries back to love of the good; [20] for because in a way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related to 'good John Styles'43; for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of 'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to himself, as has been said,44 because he has two factors within him which by nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw asunder. Therefore in the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . . .45 so it is not dear to itself. But neither are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with the appetite. And affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither connection is in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the individual is still one as long as he lives. From what has been said, then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term 'affection,' and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one. [1241a] [1] It is relative to our inquiry to consider also the subject of agreement of feeling and kindly feeling46; for some people think that they are the same thing, and others that they cannot exist apart. Kindly feeling is neither entirely distinct from friendship nor yet identical with it. If friendship is divided into three modes, kindly feeling is not found in the friendship of utility nor in friendship for pleasure. If A wishes B prosperity because he is useful, the motive of his wish would be not B's interest but his own, whereas it is thought that kindly feeling like . . .47 is not for the sake of the person who feels it himself but for the sake of him for whom he feels kindly; and if kindly feeling were found in friendship for the pleasant, men would feel kindly even towards inanimate objects. So that it is clear that kindly feeling has to do with the friendship that is based on character. But it is the mark of one who feels kindly only to wish good, whereas it is the mark of the friend also to do the good that he wishes; for kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, as every friend feels kindly, but not everyone who feels kindly is a friend, since the kindly man is only as it were making a beginning. Therefore kindly feeling is the beginning of friendship, but it is not friendship.

For it is thought that friends agree in feeling, and that those who agree in feeling are friends. But the agreement of friendship is not in regard to everything, but to things practicable for the parties, and the good to all that contributes to their association. Nor is it only agreement in thought or in appetition, for it is possible to think and to desire opposite things, [20] as in the man lacking self-control this discord occurs; if a man agrees with another in purposive choice he does not necessarily agree with him in desire also. Agreement occurs in the case of good men—at all events when bad men purpose and desire the same things they harm one another. And it appears that agreement, like friendship, is not a term of single meaning, but whereas the primary and natural form of it is good, so that it is not possible for bad men to agree in this way, there is another sort of agreement shown even by bad men when their purpose and desire are for the same objects. But it is only proper for them to aim at the same objects in cases when it is possible for both to have the things aimed at, since if they aim at a thing of a kind that it is not possible for both to have, they will quarrel; but those who agree in mind do not quarrel.

Therefore agreement exists when there is the same purposive choice as to ruling and being ruled—not each choosing himself to rule but both the same one. Agreement is civic friendship. So much for the subject of agreement in feeling and kindly feeling.

The question is raised, why those who have conferred a benefit feel more affection for those who have received it than those who have received it feel for those who have conferred it; whereas justice seems to require the opposite. One might conceive that it occurs for reasons of utility and personal benefit; for benefit is owing to one party and it is the other party's duty to repay it. But really it is not this alone; it is also a law of nature—activity is a more desirable thing, [1241b] [1] and there is the same relation between effect and activity as between the parties here: the person benefited is as it were the product of the benefactor. This is why even animals have the philoprogenitive instinct, which urges them to produce offspring and also to protect the offspring produced. And in fact fathers love their children more than they are loved by them (mothers more so than fathers)48 and these in their turn love their children more than their parents, because activity is the greatest good. And mothers love their children more than fathers, because they think that the children are more their work; for people estimate work by its difficulty, and in the production of a child the mother has more pain.

Such may be our decision on the subject of friendship for oneself and of friendship among more than one.

It is thought that what is just is something that is equal, and also that friendship is based on equality, if there is truth in the saying 'Amity is equality.' And all constitutions are some species of justice; for they are partnerships, and every partnership is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other and have their differentia closely related. But since the relations of soul and body, craftsman and tool, and master and slave are similar,49 between the two terms of each of these pairs there is no partnership; [20] for they are not two, but the former is one and the latter a part of that one, not one itself; nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both belongs to the one for whose sake they exist. For the body is the soul's tool born with it, a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master, a tool is a sort of inanimate slave.

The other partnerships are a constituent part of the partnerships of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood or a priesthood, or with business partnerships. All forms of constitution exist together in the household, both the correct forms and the deviations (for the same thing is found in constitutions as in the case of musical modes)50— paternal authority being royal, the relationship of man and wife aristocratic, that of brothers a republic, while the deviation-forms of these are tyranny, oligarchy and democracy; and there are therefore as many varieties of justice.

And since there are two sorts of equality, numerical and proportional, there will also be various species of justice and of partnership and friendship. The partnership of democracy is based on numerical equality, and so is the friendship of comrades, as it is measured by the same standard; whereas the aristocratic partnership (which is the best) and the royal are proportional, for it is just for superior and inferior to have not the same share but proportional shares; and similarly also the friendship of father and son, and the same way in partnerships. [1242a] [1]

Specified sorts of friendship are therefore the friendship of relatives, that of comrades, that of partners and what is termed civic friendship. Really friendship of relatives has more than one species, one as between brothers, another as of father and son51: it may be proportional, for example paternal friendship, or based on number, for example the friendship of brothers—for this is near the friendship of comrades, as in this also they claim privileges of seniority. Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent—since they would have been formed in any case merely for the sake of society. Only civic friendship and the deviation from it are not merely friendships but also partnerships on a friendly footing; the others are on a basis of superiority. The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice. The coming together of a saw with the craft that uses it is on different lines—it is not for the sake of some common object, for saw and craft are like instrument and spirit, but for the sake of the man who employs them. It does indeed come about that even the tool itself receives attention which it deserves with a view to its work, since it exists for the sake of its work, and the essential nature of a gimlet is twofold, the more important half being its activity, boring.52 And the body and the slave are in the class of tool, as has been said before.53 [20] Therefore to seek the proper way of associating with a friend is to seek for a particular kind of justice. In fact the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons; and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner, either in one's family54 or in one's life. For man is not only a political but also a house-holding animal, and does not, like the other animals, couple occasionally and with any chance female or male, but man is in a special way not a solitary but a gregarious animal, associating with the persons with whom he has a natural kinship; accordingly there would be partnership; and justice of a sort, even if there were no state. And a household is a sort of friendship—or rather the relationships of master and slave is that of craft and tools, and of spirit and body, and such relationships are not friendships or forms of justice but something analogous, just as health55 is not justice but analogous to it. But the friendship of man and wife is one of utility, a partnership; that of father and son is the same as that between god and man and between benefactor and beneficiary, and generally between natural ruler and natural subject. That between brothers is principally the friendship of comrades, as being on a footing of equality—“ For never did he make me out a bastard,
But the same Zeus, my lord, was called the sire
Of both—
”56 for these are the words of men seeking equality. [1242b] [1] Hence in the household are first found the origins and springs of friendship, of political organization and of justice.

And since there are three sorts of friendship, based on goodness, on utility and on pleasure, and two varieties of each sort (for each of them is either on a basis of superiority or of equality), and what is just in relation to them is clear from our discussions, in the variety based on superiority the proportionate claims are not on the same lines, but the superior party claims by inverse proportion—the contribution of the inferior to stand in the same ratio to his own as he himself stands in to the inferior, his attitude being that of ruler to subject; or if not that, at all events he claims a numerically equal share (for in fact it happens in this way in other associations too—sometimes the shares are numerically equal, sometimes proportionally: if the parties contributed a numerically equal sum of money, they also take a share equal by numerical equality, if an unequal sum, a share proportionally equal). The inferior party on the contrary inverts the proportion, and makes a diagonal conjunction57; but it would seem that in this way the superior comes off worse, and the friendship or partnership is a charitable service.58 Therefore equality must be restored and proportion secured by some other means; and this means is honor, [20] which belongs by nature to a ruler and god in relation to a subject. But the profit59 must be made equal to the honor.

Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the same way as different cities are, and "Athens no longer knoweth Megara,"60 nor similarly do citizens know one another, when they are not useful to one another; their friendship is a ready-money transaction.61 Nevertheless there is present here a ruling factor and a ruled—not a natural ruler or a royal one, but one that rules in his turn, and not for the purpose of conferring benefit, as God rules, but in order that he may have an equal share of the benefit and of the burden. Therefore civic friendship aims at being on a footing of equality. But useful friendship is of two kinds, the merely legal and the moral. Civic friendship looks to equality and to the object, as buyers and sellers do—hence the saying “ Unto a friend his wage—
”.62

When, therefore, it is based on a definite agreement, this is civic and legal friendship; but when they trust each other for repayment, it tends to be moral friendship, that of comrades. Hence this is the kind of friendship in which recriminations most occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature; for friendship based on utility and friendship based on goodness are different, but these people wish to have it both ways at once—they associate together for the sake of utility but make it out to be a moral friendship as between good men, [1243a] [1] and so represent it as not merely legal, pretending that it is a matter of trust.

For in general, of the three kinds of friendship, it is in useful friendship that most recriminations occur (for goodness is not given to recrimination, and pleasant friends having got and given their share break it off, but useful friends do not dissolve the association at once, if their intercourse is on comradely and not merely legal lines); nevertheless the legal sort of useful friendship is not given to recrimination. The legal method of discharging the obligation is a matter of money, for that serves as a measure of equality; but the moral method is voluntary. Hence in some places there is a law prohibiting friendly associates of this sort from actions as to their voluntary contracts—rightly, since it is not natural for good men to go to law,63 and these men make their contracts as good men and as dealing with trustworthy people. And in fact in this sort of friendship the recriminations are doubtful on both sides—what line of accusation each party will take, inasmuch as their confidence was of a moral kind and not merely legal.64

Indeed it is a question in which of two ways one ought to judge what is a just return, whether by looking at the actual amount or quality of the service rendered, or by its amount or quality for the recipient; for it may be as Theognis says—“ Goddess, 'tis small to thee, but great to me
”,65 and also the result may be opposite, as in the saying [20] 'This is sport to you but death to me.' Hence recriminations, as has been said66; for one party claims recompense as having rendered a great service, because he did it for his friend in need, or saying something else of the sort as to how much it was worth in relation to the benefit given to the recipient and not what it was to himself, while the other party on the contrary speaks of how much it was to the donor and not bow much it was to himself. And at other times the position is reversed: the one says how little he got out of it, the other how much the service was worth to him—for instance, if by taking a risk he did the other a shilling's worth of benefit, the one talks about the amount of the risk and the other about the amount of the cash; just as in the repayment of a money loan, for there too the dispute turns on this—one claims to be repaid the value that the money had when lent,the other claims to repay it at the present value, unless they have put a proviso in the contract.

Civic friendship, then, looks at the agreement and to the thing, but moral friendship at the intention; hence the latter is more just—it is friendly justice. The cause of conflict is that moral friendship is nobler but friendship of utility more necessary; and men begin as being moral friends and friends on grounds of goodness, but when some private interest comes into collision it becomes clear that really they were different. For most men pursue what is fine only when they have a good margin in hand, and so with the finer sort of friendship too. [1243b] [1] Hence it is clear how these cases must be decided. If they are moral friends, we must consider if their intentions are equal, and nothing else must be claimed by either from the other; and if they are friends on the ground of utility or civic friends, we must consider what form of agreement would have been profitable for them.67 But if one says they are friends on one footing and the other on another, it is not honorable, when an active return is due, merely to make fine speeches, and similarly also in the other case68;— but since they did not provide for this in the contract, on the ground that it was a moral friendship, somebody must judge, and neither party must cheat by pretending; so that each must be content with his luck. But it is clear that moral friendship is a matter of intention, since even if a man after having received great benefits owing to inability did not repay them, but only repaid as much as he was able, he acts honorably; for even God is content with getting sacrifices in accordance with our ability. But a seller will not be satisfied if a man says he cannot pay more, nor will one who has made a loan.

In friendships not based on direct reciprocity69 many causes of recrimination occur, and it is not easy to see what is just; for it is difficult to measure by one given thing relations that are not directly reciprocal. This is how it happens in love affairs, since in them one party pursues the other as a pleasant person to live with, but sometimes the other the one as useful, and when the lover ceases to love, [20] he having changed the other changes, and then they calculate the quid pro quo, and quarrel as Pytho and Pammenes70 used, and as teacher and pupil do in general (for knowledge and money have no common measure), and as Herodicus71 the doctor did with the patient who offered to pay his fee with a discount, and as the harpist and the king fell out. The king associated with the harpist as pleasant and the harpist with the king as useful; but the king, when the time came for him to pay, made out that he was himself of the pleasant sort, and said that just as the harpist had given him pleasure by his singing, so he had given the harpist pleasure by his promises to him.72 Nevertheless here too it is clear how we must decide: here too we must measure by one standard, but by a ratio, not a number. For we must measure by proportion, as also the civic partnership is measured. For how is a shoemaker to be partner with a farmer unless their products are equalized by proportion? Therefore the measure for partnerships not directly reciprocal is proportion—for example if one party complains that he has given wisdom and the other says he has given the former money, what is the ratio of wisdom to being rich? and then, what is the amount given for each? for if one party has given half of the smaller amount but the other not even a small fraction of the larger, it is clear that the latter is cheating. But here too there is a dispute at the outset, if one says that they came together on grounds of utility and the other denies it and says it was on the basis of some other kind of friendship. [1244a] [1]

About the good friend and the friend on the basis of goodness, we must consider whether one ought to render useful services and assistance to him or to the friend who is able to make an equal return. This is the same problem as whether it is more one's duty to benefit a friend or a virtuous man. If a man is a friend and virtuous, perhaps73 it is not over-difficult, provided one does not exaggerate the one factor and underrate the other, benefiting him greatly as friend but only slightly as good. But in other cases many problems arise, for instance, if A was a friend but is going not to be and B is going to be but is not now, or if A became one but is not one now and B is one now but was not and is going not to be. But the former problem74 is more difficult. For possibly there is something in the lines of Euripides75:

    “ Prithee take words as thy just pay for words,
    But he, that gave a deed, a deed shall have;
    ”
    Eur. Fr. 882 (Nauck)

and it is not one's duty to give everything to one's father, but there are other things that one ought to give to one's mother, although the father is the superior; for even to Zeus not all the sacrifices are offered, nor does he have all the honors but some particular ones. Perhaps, therefore, there are some services that ought to be rendered to the useful friend and others to the good friend: for instance, if a friend gives you food and necessaries you are not therefore bound to give him your society, and accordingly also you are not bound to render to the friend to whom you give your society the things that you do not get from him but from the useful friend; but those who by so doing wrongly give everything to one whom they love are good-for-nothing people. [20] And the defining marks of friendship stated in the discourses all belong to friendship in some sense, but not to the same kind of friendship. It is a mark of the useful friend that one wishes the things good for him, and so of the benefactor, and in fact a friend of any sort (for this definition of friendship is not distinctive); of another friend, that one wishes his existence, of another that one wishes his society; of the friend on the ground of pleasure, that one shares his grief and his joy. All these defining marks are predicated in the case of some friendship, but none of them with reference to friendship as a single thing. Hence there are many of them, and each is thought to belong to friendship as one, though it does not: for instance, the desire for the friend's existence—for the superior friend and benefactor wishes existence to belong to his own work76—and to him who gave one existence77 it is one's duty to give existence in return; but he wishes the society not of this friend but of the pleasant one.

Friends in some cases wrong each other, because they love things more, not the possessor of them, and are friends of the possessor too on this account (just as a man chose his wine because it was sweet and chose his wealth because it was useful), for he is more useful.78 Hence naturally he is annoyed, just as if they had preferred his possessions to himself as being inferior; and they complain, for now they look to find in him the good man, having previously looked for the pleasant or the useful man. [1244b] [1]

We must also consider self-sufficiency and friendship, and the interrelationship of their potentialities. For one may raise the question whether if a person be self-sufficing in every respect he will have a friend, or whether on the contrary a friend is sought for in need, and the good man will be most self-sufficing. If the life that is combined with goodness is happy, what need would there be of a friend? For it does not belong to the self-sufficing man to need either useful friends or friends to amuse him and society, for he is sufficient society for himself. This is most manifest in the case of God; for it is clear that as he needs nothing more he will not need a friend, and that supposing he has no need of one he will not have one. Consequently the happiest human being also will very little need a friend, except in so far as to be self-sufficing is impossible. Of necessity, therefore, he who lives the best life will have fewest friends, and they will constantly become fewer, and he will not be eager to have friends but will think lightly not only of useful friends but also of those desirable for society. But assuredly even his case would seem to show that a friend is not for the sake of utility or benefit but that one loved on account of goodness is the only real friend. For when we are not in need of something, then we all seek people to share our enjoyments, and beneficiaries rather than benefactors; [20] and we can judge them better when we are self-sufficing than when in need, and we most need friends who are worthy of our society.

But about this question we must consider whether perhaps, although the view stated is partly sound, in part the truth escapes us because of the comparison.79 The matter is clear if we ascertain what life in the active sense and as an End is. It is manifest that life is perception and knowledge, and that consequently social life is perception and knowledge in common. But perception and knowledge themselves are the thing most desirable for each individually (and it is owing to this that the appetition for life is implanted by nature in all, for living must be deemed a mode of knowing). If therefore one were to abstract and posit absolute knowledge and its negation (though this, it is true, is obscure in the argument as we have written it, but it may be observed in experience), there would be no difference between absolute knowledge and another person's knowing instead of oneself; but that is like another person's living instead of oneself, whereas perceiving and knowing oneself is reasonably more desirable. For two things must be taken into consideration together, that life is desirable and that good is desirable, and as a consequence that it is desirable for ourselves to possess a nature of that quality.80 [1245a] [1] If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series81 of this kind one is always in the class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally speaking constituted by their participation in the 'determined' nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives,82 in the manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes to be oneself the object known. To choose to live in the society of others might, therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing, since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it pleasanter to share good things with our friends, [20] as far as these fall to each, and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend (whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are'83), so that they must not be separated when this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship, for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.

Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former position,84 but the facts of experience are obviously on the latter lines, so that it is clear that the raiser of the question in a way misleads us. We must therefore examine the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes, in the language of the proverb,85'another Hercules'—another self; but the characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in spirit, and one in one part of the body or spirit, another in another. But still none the less a friend really means as it were a separate self. To perceive and to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently to share even vulgar pleasures and ordinary life with a friend is naturally pleasant (for it always involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), but more so to share the more divine pleasures; the reason of which is that it is always more pleasant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good, [1245b] [1] and this is sometimes a passive, sometimes an active experience, sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be pre-eminently in things included in the End. Hence we should study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose most of all to benefit their friends and to be benefited by them. It is therefore manifest that to live together is actually a duty, and that all people wish it very much, and that this is most the case with the man that is the happiest and best. But that the contrary appeared to be the conclusion of the argument86 was also reasonable, the statement being true. For the solution is on the line of the comparison,87 the correspondence being true; for the fact that God is not of such a nature as to need a friend postulates that man, who is like God, also does not need one. Yet according to this argument the virtuous man will not think of anything; for God's perfection does not permit of this, but he is too perfect to think of anything else beside himself. And the reason is that for us well-being has reference to something other than ourselves, but in his case he is himself his own well-being. [20] As to seeking for ourselves and praying for many friends, and at the same time saying that one who has many friends has no friend, both statements are correct. For if it is possible to live with and share the perceptions of many at once, it is most desirable for them to be the largest possible number; but as that is very difficult, active community of perception must of necessity be in a smaller circle, so that it is not only difficult to acquire many friends (for probation is needed), but also to use them when one has got them.

One for whom we feel affection we sometimes wish to prosper in absence from us, but sometimes to share the same experiences. And to wish to be together is a mark of friendship, for if it is possible to be together and to prosper all choose this; but if it is not possible to prosper together, then we choose as the mother of Heracles perhaps would have chosen for her son, to be a god rather than to be with her but in service to Eurystheus. For men would say things like the jest which the Spartan made when somebody told him to invoke the Dioscuri in a storm.88

It seems to be characteristic of one who feels affection for another to debar him from sharing his troubles, and of the person for whom affection is felt to wish to share them. Both these things happen reasonably; for to a friend nothing ought to give so much pain as his friend gives pleasure, yet it is felt that he ought not to choose his own interest. Hence people hinder their friends from sharing their sorrows; they are content to be in trouble by themselves, [1246a] [1] in order that they may not appear from selfish considerations actually to choose the joy of their friend's grief and furthermore to find it a relief not to bear their misfortunes alone. And as both well-being and companionship are desirable, it is clear that companionship combined with even a lesser good is in a way more desirable than separation with a greater good. But as it is not clear how much value companionship has, at this point men differ, and some think it is friendly to share everything in company, and say, for instance, that it is pleasanter to dine with company though having the same food; others wish to share only in well-being, because, they say, if one supposes extreme cases, people experiencing great adversity in company or great prosperity separately are on a par. And it is much the same as this in regard to misfortunes also; sometimes we wish our friends to be absent, and do not want to give them pain when their presence is not going to do any good, but at other times for them to be present is most pleasant. And the reason of this contrariety is very easily explained; it comes about because of the things stated before,89 and because to behold a friend in pain or in a bad state is a thing we absolutely shun, as we shun it in our own case, but to see a friend is as pleasant as anything can be, for the reason stated,90 and indeed to see him ill if one is ill oneself; so that whichever of these is more pleasant, it sways the balance of wishing him to be present or not. [20] And it fits in that the former occurs in the case of inferior people, and for the same reason; they are most eager for their friends not to prosper and not to be absent if they themselves have to suffer adversity. Hence sometimes suicides kill those whom they love with themselves, as they think that they feel their own misfortune more if their loved ones are to survive91; just as, if a man in trouble had the memory that he had once been prosperous, he would be more conscious of his trouble than if he thought that he had always done badly.

1

2 'Birds of a feather flock together.' Sc. ἱζάνει, 'perches': an iambic verse quoted in full Aristot. Gtr. Mor. 1208b 9, and in the form κολοιὸν ποτὶ κολοιόν Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1155a 35, where the dialect suggests that it is from a Doric poet (unknown).

3 'Set a thief to catch a thief.' The origin of the verse is unknown.

4 Mystic philosopher, man of science and statesman of Agrigentum, fl. 490 B.C.

5 Presumably, like in color; true of Greek dogs today. Empedocles does not appear to have gone on to infer protective mimicry.

6 Quoted as from Euripides, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1154a 34; the play is not known.

7 Eur. Orest. 234.

8 Hes. WD 25 ('Two of a trade never agree').

9 ἐχθρ̂ας ἡμέρας= ἔχθρας, cf. δούλιον ἦμαρ= δουλεία, Paley.

10 The natural philosopher of Ephesus, fl. end of 6th cent. B.C.

11 i.e. being so absolutely opposite to one another, they are too sweeping, and do not really correspond with the facts.

12 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1216b 3.

13 i.e. likeness, contrariety, utility (Solomon).

14 Eur. Tro. 1051.

15 i.e. are different psychological experiences.

16 ll. 7-17.

17 A friend in need is a friend indeed.

18 Hdt. 2.68, says that the trochilus picks leeches out of the crocodile's throat, Aristot. Hist. An. 9.6.6, that it picks the crocodile's teeth. In reality it picks gnats from the crocodile's open mouth.

19 Goodness and pleasantness.

20 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'or not, but because he is pleasant.'

21 Potential and actual (Solomon).

22 Ross marks this clause as corrupted.

23 Sc. (τὸ τοισδὶ ἀγαθόν) οἷς ἀγαθόν, τούτοις ἡδύ.

24 Eur. El. 941.

25 Or, emending the text, 'that friendship is goodness of nature.'

26 Eur. Bellerophontes Fr. 298 (Nauck).

27 i.e. neither good nor bad.

28 i.e. ready to associate with all and sundry, regardless of moral inferiority. But perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'some (bad men) might be worthy to associate with, even in the judgement of a good man,' or 'some might be worthy to associate with even though not good.'

29 Between two unequal persons justice divides benefits in proportion to their deserts, so that the two shares are not equal to each other but each equal to its recipient's merit. The word ἴσον itself connotes 'fair,' just, reasonable.

30 i.e. they complain if the pleasure or benefit they get from their friend is not equal (absolutely, not merely in proportion to a supposed difference of merit) to that which they give to him.

31 A dramatist of the Old Comedy.

32 See Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1236a 7-1237b 15.

33 i.e. proportional equality: see note on Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1238b 21.

34 Or 'one ought to expect the superior to feel . . .'

35 This poet lived at Syracuse at the court of Dionysus the elder (who came into power 406 B.C.). He is said to have written tragedies in collaboration with the tyrant; and he was sentenced by him to death by flogging (Aristot. Rhet. 1384a 9).

36 Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1235a 4 ff.

37 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1238a 34 note.

38 The two halves of a bone or coin broken in half by two contracting parties and one kept by each, to serve as a token of identification when found to fit together.

39 Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1239b 32.

40 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1223a 36-b 17. Self-restraint (or the lack of it) indicates that a man's personality has in a sense two parts, one of which may control the other; and similarly self-love implies that one part of the personality can have a certain feeling in regard to another part.

41 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1244a 20. Perhaps a reference to Aristotle's lectures (Stock).

42 Cf. 1. 3: δή marks a quotation.

43 See Sophistici Elenchi 175b 15ff. 'Coriscus' is used for any imaginary person, cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220a 19 f.

44 ll. 13-21.

45 Some words seem to have been lost here.

46 These are Solomon's versions of the terms usually rendered 'concord and goodwill.'

47 Perhaps 'virtuous friendship' should be supplied.

48 This clause is probably an interpolation in the Greek.

49 i.e. to one another. Perhaps the Greek should be amended to give 'not similar' (to those just mentioned).

50 Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1342a 24τῶν ἁρμονιῶν παρεκβάσεις εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν μελῶν τὰ σύντονα καὶ παρακεχρωσμένα, 'those harmonies and melodies that are highly strung and irregular in coloration (i.e. divergent from the regular scale in having smaller intervals) are deviations.'

51 These two clauses look like an interpolation.

52 Not its ἕξις, its shape, hardness, etc.

53 Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1241b 17-24.

54 i.e. 'friend' in the sense of 'relation.'

55 Perhaps the text is corrupt.

56 Soph. Fr. 755 (Jebb and Pearson; 684 Nauck). The third line is completed in a quotation by Philo, θνητῶν δ᾽ οὐδείς. (For τῷδε dative of agent see Kuhner-Gerth, i. 422).

57 The inferior party p claims to draw a larger share of benefit B and to leave the smaller share b to the superior party P, the result of which would be p+B and P+b. The superior party P also invokes the principle of inverse proportion (line 7), but applies it to their contributions to the common cause, not to the benefits drawn from it: he claims to make a smaller contribution c, while the inferior party makes a larger one C, the result of which would be P-c and p-C. The proposed conjunctions are in fact both of them diagonal, connecting the larger person with the smaller thing and vice versa.

58 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give 'friendship is a charity and not a partnership.'

59 i.e. the advantage in the shape of protection, guidance, etc., that the inferior party derives from the friendship.

60 Lit. 'the Athenians no longer recognize the Megarians.' Author unknown Fr. Eleg. Adespota 6 (Bergk).

61 Cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1262b 26.

62 Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1164a 28. Hes. WD 371μισθὸς δ᾽ ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ εἰρημένος ἄρκιος ἔστω'let the wage stated for a friend stand good.

63 Or, adopting another conjectural emendation, 'since it is natural for good men to be just of their own accord.'

64 Solomon renders 'It is uncertain how either will recriminate on the other, seeing that they trust each other, not in a limited legal way but on the basis of their characters.' But the Greek text may be questioned.

65 Theog. 14. This quotation illustrates that the amount of a service is 'subjective,' the next quotation shows that its quality is.

66 Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1242b 37.

67 Or, altering the Greek, 'they agree for as long as it profits them.'

68 i.e. in a moral friendship it is not honorable to insist on a return on a business footing.

69 'Dissimilar friendships, where action and reaction are not in the same straight line' (Solomon).

70 The distinguished Theban general, friend of Epaminondas. Pytho may be a dramatist of Catana, or a Byzantine rhetorician of the period.

71 Born in Thrace, practised in Athens fifth cent. B.C.; tutor of Hippocrates. The Mss. give 'Prodicus' (the sophist, who figures frequently in Plato), and possibly the text has suffered haplography, and both names should be read.

72 The story (also told in Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1164a 16) is related by Plut. De Alexandri fortuna 2.1, of the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse.

73 Or, altering the punctuation with Fritsche, 'is a friend and virtuous equally.'

74 See the first sentence of the chapter.

75 Eur. Fr. 882 (Nauck).

76 i.e. the beneficiary.

77 This also means the beneficiary, who is the cause of the benefactor's being a benefactor; so the benefactor ought to repay him in kind by wishing his existence (as he does also for the reason that he is his own product.)

78 Sc. on account of his possessions.

79 i.e. of man with God, l. 8 above; cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245b 13.

80 τοιαύτην= ἀγαθήν.

81 e.g. the Pythagorean pair of series, One, Good, etc. opposed to Many, Bad, etc. (Solomon). 'The Determined' (opposed to 'the Indeterminate') belonged to the 'desirable' series.

82 i.e. perception of something outside oneself causes consciousness of self.

83 This proverb looks like a quotation, being half a line of verse.

84 See Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1244b 2ff., Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245a 27.

85 Quoted elsewhere in the same connection, but one may conjecture that the phrase originally meant 'as strong as Hercules.'

86 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1244b 2ff., Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245a.27.

87 i.e. of man with God, Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1244b 7.

88 He doubtless said that being in trouble himself he did not wish to involve the Dioscuri in it (Solomon).

89 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245b 26-1246a 2.

90 Cf. Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1245a 26-b 9.

91 In the Greek this clause is left to be understood.